Arbitrage-Free XVA by Bichuch, Maxim et al.
Arbitrage-Free XVA
Maxim Bichuch ∗ Agostino Capponi † Stephan Sturm ‡
August 10, 2016
Abstract
We develop a framework for computing the total valuation adjustment (XVA) of a European
claim accounting for funding costs, counterparty credit risk, and collateralization. Based on no-
arbitrage arguments, we derive backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs) associated with
the replicating portfolios of long and short positions in the claim. This leads to the definition of
buyer’s and seller’s XVA, which in turn identify a no-arbitrage interval. In the case that borrowing
and lending rates coincide, we provide a fully explicit expression for the unique XVA, expressed as
a percentage of the price of the traded claim, and for the corresponding replication strategies. In
the general case of asymmetric funding, repo and collateral rates, we study the semilinear partial
differential equations (PDE) characterizing buyer’s and seller’s XVA and show the existence of a
unique classical solution to it. To illustrate our results, we conduct a numerical study demonstrating
how funding costs, repo rates, and counterparty risk contribute to determine the total valuation
adjustment.1
Keywords: XVA, counterparty credit risk, funding spreads, backward stochastic differential
equations, arbitrage-free valuation.
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1 Introduction
When managing a portfolio, a trader needs to raise cash in order to finance a number of operations.
Those include maintaining the hedge of the position, posting collateral resources, and paying interest
on collateral received. Moreover, the trader needs to account for the possibility that the position may
be liquidated prematurely due to his own or his counterparty’s default, hence entailing additional costs
due to the closeout procedure. Cash resources are provided to the trader by his treasury desk, and
must be remunerated. If he is borrowing, he will be charged an interest rate depending on current
∗Email: mbichuch@jhu.edu, Department of Applied Mathematics and Statistics, Johns Hopkins University
†Email: ac3827@columbia.edu, Industrial Engineering and Operations Research Department, Columbia University
‡Email: ssturm@wpi.edu, Department of Mathematical Sciences, Worcester Polytechnic Institute
1This article subsumes the two permanent working papers by the same authors: “Arbitrage-Free Pricing of XVA - Part
I: Framework and Explicit Examples”, and “Arbitrage-Free Pricing of XVA - Part II: PDE Representation and Numerical
Analysis”. These papers are accessible at http://arxiv.org/abs/1501.05893 and http://arxiv.org/abs/1502.06106,
respectively.
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market conditions as well as on his own credit quality. Such a rate is usually higher than the rate
at which the trader lends excess cash proceeds from his investment strategy to his treasury. The
difference between borrowing and lending rate is also referred to as funding spread.
Even though pricing by replication can still be put to work under this rate asymmetry, the classical
Black-Scholes formula no longer yields the price of the claim. In the absence of default risk, few
studies have been devoted to pricing and hedging claims in markets with differential rates. Korn
(1995) considers option pricing in a market with a higher borrowing than lending rate, and derives an
interval of acceptable prices for both the buyer and the seller. Cvitanić and Karatzas (1993) consider
the problem of hedging contingent claims under portfolio constraints allowing for a higher borrowing
than lending rate. El Karoui et al. (1997) study the super-hedging price of a contingent claim under
rate asymmetry via nonlinear backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs).
The above studies do not consider the impact of counterparty credit risk on valuation and hedging
of the derivative security. The new set of rules mandated by the Basel Committee (Basel III (2010)) to
govern bilateral trading in OTC markets requires to take into account default and funding costs when
marking to market derivatives positions. This has originated a growing stream of literature, some
of which is surveyed next. Crépey (2015a) and Crépey (2015b) introduce a BSDE approach for the
valuation of counterparty credit risk taking funding constraints into account. He decomposes the value
of the transaction into three separate components, the contract (portfolio of over-the-counter deriva-
tives), the hedging assets used to hedge market risk of the portfolio as well as counterparty credit risk,
and the funding assets needed to finance the hedging strategy. Brigo and Pallavicini (2014) and Brigo
et al. (2012) derive a risk-neutral pricing formula by taking into account counterparty credit risk,
funding, and collateral servicing costs, and provide the corresponding BSDE representation. Piterbarg
(2010) derives a closed form solution for the price of a derivative contract, which distinguishes between
funding, repo and collateral rates, but ignores the possibility of counterparty’s default. Moreover, he
assumes that borrowing and lending rates are equal, an assumption which has been later relaxed by
Mercurio (2014a). Burgard and Kjaer (2011a) and Burgard and Kjaer (2011b) generalize Piterbarg
(2010)’s model to include default risk of the trader and of his counterparty. They derive PDE repre-
sentations for the price of the derivative via a replication approach, assuming the absence of arbitrage
and sufficient smoothness of the derivative price. Bielecki and Rutkowski (2014) develop a general
semimartingale market framework and derive the BSDE representation of the wealth process associ-
ated with a self-financing trading strategy that replicates a default-free claim. As in Piterbarg (2010),
they do not take counterparty credit risk into account. Nie and Rutkowski (2013), study the existence
of fair bilateral prices. A good overview of the current literature is given in Crépey et al. (2014).
In the present article we introduce a valuation framework which allows us to quantify the total
valuation adjustment, abbreviated as XVA, of a European type claim. We consider an underlying
portfolio consisting of a default-free stock and two risky bonds underwritten by the trader’s firm and
his counterparty. Stock purchases and sales are financed through the security lending market. We
allow for asymmetry between treasury borrowing and lending rates, repo lending and borrowing rates,
as well as between interest rates paid by the collateral taker and received by the collateral provider.
We derive the nonlinear BSDEs associated with the portfolios replicating long and short positions
in the traded claim, taking into account counterparty credit risk and closeout payoffs exchanged at
default. Due to rate asymmetries, the BSDE which represents the valuation process of the portfolio
replicating a long position in the claim cannot be directly obtained (via a sign change) from the one
replicating a short position. More specifically, there is a no-arbitrage interval which can be defined in
terms of the buyer’s and the seller’s XVA.
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We show that our framework recovers the model proposed by Piterbarg (2010), as well its extension
to the case in which the hedger and his counterparty can default. In both cases, we can express the
total valuation adjustment in closed form, as a percentage of the publicly available price of the claim.
This gives an interpretation of the XVA in terms of funding costs of a trade and counterparty risk, and
has risk management implications because it pushes banks to compress trades so as to reduce their
borrowing costs and counterparty credit exposures (see ISDA (2015)). One of the crucial assumptions
of the Piterbarg’s setup is that rates are symmetric. In the case of asymmetric rates, closed form
expressions are unavailable, but we can still exploit the connection between the BSDEs and the
corresponding nonlinear PDEs to study numerically how funding spreads, collateral and counterparty
risk affect the total valuation adjustment. In this regard, our study extends the previous literature in
two directions. First, we develop a rigorous study of the semilinear PDEs associated with the nonlinear
BSDEs yielding the XVA. Related studies of the PDE representations of XVA include Burgard and
Kjaer (2011a) and Burgard and Kjaer (2011b), who consider an extended Black-Scholes framework
in which two corporate bonds are introduced in order to hedge the default risk of the trader and of
his counterparty. They generalize their framework in Burgard and Kjaer (2013) to include collateral
mitigation and evaluate the impact of different funding strategies. Second, we provide a comprehensive
numerical analysis which exploits the previously established existence and uniqueness result. We find
strong sensitivity of XVA to funding costs, repo rates, and counterparty risk. Viewing both buyer’s and
seller’s XVA as functions of collateralization levels defines a no-arbitrage band whose width increases
with the funding spread and the difference between borrowing and lending repo rates. As the position
becomes more collateralized, the trader needs to finance a larger position and the XVA increases.
Both buyer’s and seller’s XVA may decrease if the rates of return of trader and counterparty bonds
are higher than the funding costs incurred for replicating the closeout position.
The paper is organized as follows. We develop the model in Section 2 and introduce the replicated
claim and collateral process in Section 3. We analyze arbitrage-free valuation and XVA in the presence
of funding costs and counterparty risk, referred to as XVA, in Section 4. Section 5 provides an explicit
expression for the XVA under equal borrowing and lending rates. Section 6 develops a numerical
analysis when borrowing and lending rates are asymmetric. Section 7 concludes the paper. Some
proofs of technical results are delegated to an Appendix.
2 The model
We consider a probability space (Ω,G,P) rich enough to support all subsequent constructions. Here, P
denotes the physical probability measure. Throughout the paper, we refer to “I” as the investor, trader
or hedger interested in computing the total valuation adjustment, and to “C” as the counterparty
to the investor in the transaction. The background or reference filtration that includes all market
information except for default events and augmented by all (G,P)-nullsets, is denoted by F := (Ft)t≥0.
The filtration containing default event information is denoted by H := (Ht)t≥0. Both filtrations will
be specified in the sequel of the paper. We denote by G := (Gt)t≥0 the enlarged filtration given by
Gt := Ft ∨Ht, augmented by (G,P)-nullsets. Note that because of the augmentation of F by nullsets,
the filtration G satisfies the usual conditions of (G,P)-completeness and right continuity; see Section
2.4 of Bélanger et al. (2004).
We distinguish between universal instruments, and investor specific instruments, depending on
whether their valuation is public or private. Private valuations are based on discount rates, which de-
pend on investor specific characteristics, while public valuations depend on publicly available discount
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factors. Throughout the paper, we will use the superscript ∧ when referring specifically to public
valuations. Section 2.1 introduces the universal securities. Investor specific securities are introduced
in Section 2.2.
2.1 Universal instruments
This class includes the default-free stock on which the financial claim is written, and the security
account used to support purchases or sales of the stock security. Moreover, it includes the risky bond
issued by the trader as well as the one issued by his counterparty.
The stock security. We let F := (Ft)t≥0 be the (G,P)-augmentation of the filtration generated by
a standard Brownian motion W P under the measure P. Under the physical measure, the dynamics of
the stock price is given by
dSt = µSt dt+ σSt dW Pt ,
where µ and σ are constants denoting, respectively, the appreciation rate and the volatility of the
stock.
The security account. Borrowing and lending activities related to the stock security happen
through the security lending or repo market. We do not distinguish between security lending and
repo, but refer to all of them as repo transactions. We consider two types of repo transactions: se-
curity driven and cash driven, see also Adrian et al. (2013). The security driven transaction is used
to overcome the prohibition on “naked” short sales of stocks, that is the prohibition to the trader of
selling a stock which he does not hold and hence cannot deliver. The repo market helps to overcome
this by allowing the trader to lend cash to the participants in the repo market who would post the
stock as a collateral to the trader. The trader would later return the stock collateral in exchange
of a pre-specified amount, usually slightly higher than the original loan amount. Hence, effectively
this collateralized loan has a rate, referred to as the repo rate. The cash lender can sell the stock on
an exchange, and later, at the maturity of the repo contract, buy it back and return it to the cash
borrower. We illustrate the mechanics of the security driven transaction in Figure 1.
The other type of transaction is cash driven. This is essentially the other side of the trade, and is
implemented when the trader wants a long position in the stock security. In this case, he borrows cash
from the repo market, uses it to purchase the stock security posted as collateral to the loan, and agrees
to repurchase the collateral later at a slightly higher price. The difference between the original price
of the collateral and the repurchase price defines the repo rate. As the loan is collateralized, the repo
rate will be lower than the rate of an uncollateralized loan. At maturity of the repo contract, when
the trader has repurchased the stock collateral from the repo market, he can sell it on the exchange.
The details of the cash driven transaction are summarized in Figure 2.
We use r+r to denote the rate charged by the hedger when he lends money to the repo market
and implements his short-selling position. We use r−r to denote the rate that he is charged when he
borrows money from the repo market and implements a long position. We denote by Br+r and Br−r
the repo accounts whose drifts are given, respectively, by r+r and r−r . Their dynamics are given by
dBr
±
r
t = r±r B
r±r
t dt.
For future purposes, define
Brrt := Brrt
(
ψr
)
= e
∫ t
0 rr(ψ
r
s)ds, (1)
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Figure 1: Security driven repo activity: Solid lines are purchases/sales, dashed lines borrowing/lending,
dotted lines interest due; blue lines are cash, red lines are stock. The treasury desk lends money to
the trader (1) who uses it to lend to the repo market (2) receiving in turn collateral (3). He sells the
stock on the market to get effectively into a short position (4) earning cash from the deal (5) which
he uses to repay his debt to the funding desk (6). As a cash lender, he receives interest at the rate
r+r from the repo market. There are no interest payments between trader and treasury desk as the
payments (1) and (6) cancel each other out.
where
rr(x) = r−r 1l{x<0} + r+r 1l{x>0}. (2)
Here, ψrt denotes the number of shares of the repo account held at time t. Equations (1)-(2) indicate
that the trader earns the rate r+r when lending ψr > 0 shares of the repo account to implement the
short-selling of −ξ shares of the stock security, i.e., ξ < 0. Similarly, he has to pay interest rate r−r on
the −ψr (ψr < 0) shares of the repo account that he has borrowed by posting ξ > 0 shares of the stock
security as collateral. Because borrowing and lending transactions are fully collateralized, it always
holds that
ψrtB
rr
t = −ξtSt. (3)
The risky bond securities. Let τi, i ∈ {I, C}, be the default times of trader and counterparty.
These default times are exponentially distributed random variables with constant intensities hPi , i ∈
{I, C}, and are independent of the filtration F. We use Hi(t) = 1l{τi≤t}, t ≥ 0, to denote the default
indicator process of i. The default event filtration is given by H = (Ht)t≥0, Ht = σ(HIu, HCu ;u ≤ t).
Such a default model is a special case of the bivariate Cox process framework, for which the (H)-
hypothesis (see Elliott et al. (2000)) is well known to hold. In particular, this implies that the
F-Brownian motion W P is also a G-Brownian motion.
We introduce two risky bond securities with zero recovery underwritten by the trader I and by his
counterparty C, and maturing at the same time T . We denote their price processes by P I and PC ,
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Figure 2: Cash driven repo activity: Solid lines are purchases/sales, dashed lines borrowing/lending,
dotted lines interest due; blue lines are cash, red lines are stock. The treasury desk lends money to the
trader (1) who uses it to purchase stock (2) from the stock market (3). He uses the stock as collateral
(4) to borrow money from the repo market (5) and uses it to repay his debt to the funding desk (6).
The trader has thus to pay interest at the rate r−r to the repo market. There are no interest payments
between trader and treasury desk as the payments (1) and (6) cancel each other out.
respectively. For 0 ≤ t ≤ T , i ∈ {I, C}, the dynamics of their price processes are given by
dP it = µiP it dt− P it− dH it , P i0 = e−µiT , (4)
with return rates µi. We do not allow bonds to be traded in the repo market. Our assumption is
driven by the consideration that the repurchase agreement market for risky bonds is often illiquid.
We also refer to the introductory discussion in Blanco et al. (2005) stating that even if a bond can be
shorted on the repo market, the tenor of the agreement is usually very short.
Throughout the paper, we use τ := τI ∧ τC ∧ T to denote the earliest of the transaction maturity
T , trader and counterparty default time.
2.2 Hedger specific instruments
This class includes the funding account and the collateral account of the hedger.
Funding account. We assume that the trader lends and borrows moneys from his treasury at
possibly different rates. Denote by r+f the rate at which the hedger lends to the treasury, and by r
−
f
the rate at which he borrows from it. We denote by Br
±
f the cash accounts corresponding to these
funding rates, whose dynamics are given by
dB
r±
f
t = r±f B
r±
f
t dt.
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Let ξft the number of shares of the funding account at time t. Define
B
rf
t := B
rf
t
(
ξf ) = e
∫ t
0 rf (ξ
f
s )ds, (5)
where
rf := rf (y) = r−f 1l{y<0} + r
+
f 1l{y>0}. (6)
Equations (5) - (6) indicate that if the hedger’s position at time t, ξft , is negative, then he needs to
finance his position. He will do so by borrowing from the treasury at the rate r−f . Similarly, if the
hedger’s position is positive, he will lend the cash amount to the treasury at the rate r+f .
Collateral process and collateral account. The role of the collateral is to mitigate counterparty
exposure of the two parties, i.e the potential loss on the transacted claim incurred by one party if
the other defaults. The collateral process C := (Ct; t ≥ 0) is an F adapted process. We use the
following sign conventions. If Ct > 0, the hedger is said to be the collateral provider. In this case the
counterparty measures a positive exposure to the hedger, hence asking him to post collateral so as to
absorb potential losses arising if the hedger defaults. Vice versa, if Ct < 0, the hedger is said to be
the collateral taker, i.e., he measures a positive exposure to the counterparty and hence asks her to
post collateral.
Collateral is posted and received in the form of cash in line with data reported by ISDA (2014),
according to which cash collateral is the most popular form of collateral.2
We denote by r+c the rate on the collateral amount received by the hedger if he has posted the
collateral, i.e., if he is the collateral provider, while r−c is the rate paid by the hedger if he has received
the collateral, i.e., if he is the collateral taker. The rates r±c typically correspond to Fed Funds or
EONIA rates, i.e., to the contractual rates earned by cash collateral in the US and EURO markets,
respectively. We denote by Br±c the cash accounts corresponding to these collateral rates, whose
dynamics are given by
dBr
±
c
t = r±c B
r±c
t dt.
Moreover, let us define
Brct := Brct (C) = e
∫ t
0 rc(Cs)ds,
where
rc(x) = r+c 1l{x>0} + r−c 1l{x<0}.
Let ψct be the number of shares of the collateral account Brct held by the trader at time t. Then it
must hold that
ψctB
rc
t = −Ct. (7)
The latter relation means that if the trader is the collateral taker at t, i.e., Ct < 0, then he has
purchased shares of the collateral account i.e., ψct > 0. Vice versa, if the trader is the collateral
provider at time t, i.e., Ct > 0, then he has sold shares of the collateral account to her counterparty.
Before proceeding further, we visualize in Figure 3 the mechanics governing the entire flow of
transactions taking place.
2According to ISDA (2014) (see Table 3 therein), cash represents slightly more than 78% of the total collateral
delivered and these figures are broadly consistent across years. Government securities instead only constitute 18% of
total collateral delivered and other forms of collateral consisting of riskier assets, such as municipal bonds, corporate
bonds, equity or commodities only represent a fraction slightly higher than 3%.
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Figure 3: Trading: Solid lines are purchases/sales, dashed lines borrowing/lending, dotted lines interest
due; blue lines are cash, red lines are stock purchases for cash and black lines are bond purchases for
cash.
3 Replicated claim, close-out value and wealth process
We take the viewpoint of a trader who wants to replicate a European type claim on the stock security.
Such a claim is purchased or sold by the trader from/to his counterparty over-the-counter and hence
subject to counterparty credit risk. The closeout value of the claim is decided by a valuation agent who
might either be one of the parties or a third party, in accordance with market practices as reviewed
by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). The valuation agent determines the
closeout value of the transaction by calculating the Black Scholes price of the derivative using the
discount rate rD. Such a (publicly available) discount rate enables the hedger to introduce a valuation
measure Q defined by the property that all securities have instantaneous growth rate rD under this
measure. The rest of the section is organized as follows. We give the details of the valuation measure
in Section 3.1. We introduce the valuation process of the claim to be replicated and of the collateral
process in Section 3.2. We define the class of admissible strategies in Section 3.3 and specify the
closeout procedure in Section 3.4.
3.1 The valuation measure
We first introduce the default intensity model. Under the physical measure P, default times of trader
and counterparty are assumed to be independent exponentially distributed random variables with
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constant intensities hPi , i ∈ {I, C}. It then holds that for each i ∈ {I, C}
$i,Pt := H it −
∫ t
0
(
1−H iu
)
hPi du
is a (G,P)-martingale. The valuation measure Q associated with the publicly available discount rate
rD chosen by the valuation agent is equivalent to P and given by the Radon-Nikodým density
dQ
dP
∣∣∣∣
Gτ
= e
rD−µ
σ
W Pτ− (rD−µ)
2
2σ2 τ
(µI − rD
hPI
)HIτ
e(rD−µI+h
P
I)τ
(µC − rD
hPC
)HCτ
e(rD−µC+h
P
C)τ .
We also recall that µI and µC denote the rate of returns of the bonds underwritten by the trader and
counterparty respectively. Under Q, the dynamics of the risky assets are given by
dSt = rDSt dt+ σSt dWQt , (8)
dP It = rDP It dt− P It−d$I,Qt ,
dPCt = rDPCt dt− PCt−d$C,Qt ,
where WQ := (WQt ; 0 ≤ t ≤ τ) is a (G,Q)-Brownian motion and $I,Q := ($I,Qt ; 0 ≤ t ≤ τ) as
well as $C,Q := ($C,Qt ; 0 ≤ t ≤ τ) are (G,Q)-martingales. The above dynamics of P It and PCt
under the valuation measure Q can be deduced from their respective price processes given in (4) via
a straightforward application of the Itô’s formula.
By application of Girsanov’s theorem, we have the following relations: WQt = W Pt + µ−rDσ t, $
i,Q
t =
$i,Pt +
∫ t
0
(
1−H iu
)
(hPi −hQi )du. The quantity, hQi = µi− rD, i ∈ {I, C}, is the default intensity of name
i under the valuation measure and is assumed to be positive.
3.2 Replicated claim and collateral specification
The price process of the contingent claim ϑ ∈ L2(Ω,FT ,Q) to be replicated is, according to the
valuation agent, given by
Vˆ ϑt := e−rD(T−t)EQ
[
ϑ
∣∣Ft].
We will drop the superscript ϑ and just write Vˆt when it is understood from the context. In the case of
a European option we have that ϑ = Φ(ST ), where Φ : R>0 → R is a real valued function representing
the terminal payoff of the claim and thus Vˆt = Vˆ (t, St).
Additionally, the hedger has to post collateral for the claim. As opposed to the collateral used in
the repo agreement, which is always the stock, the collateral mitigating counterparty credit risk of the
claim is always cash. The collateral is chosen to be a fraction of the current exposure process of one
party to the other. If the hedger sells a European call or put option on the security to his counterparty
(he would then need to replicate the payoff Φ(ST ), Φ ≥ 0, and deliver it to the counterparty at T ), the
counterparty always measures a positive exposure to the hedger, while the hedger has zero exposure to
the counterparty. As a result, the trader will always be the collateral provider, while the counterparty
the collateral taker. By a symmetric reasoning, if the hedger buys a European call or put option from
his counterparty (he would then replicate the payoff −Φ(ST ), Φ ≥ 0, to hedge his position), then he
will always be the collateral taker. On the event that neither the trader nor the counterparty have
defaulted by time t, the collateral process is defined by
Ct := αVˆt1l{τ>t} = αVˆ (t, St)1l{τ>t}, (9)
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where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is the collateralization level. The case when α = 0 corresponds to zero collateraliza-
tion, α = 1 gives full collateralization. Collateralization levels are industry specific and are reported
on a quarterly basis by ISDA, see for instance ISDA (2011) , Table 3.3. therein.3
Our collateral rule differs from Piterbarg (2010), where the collateral is assumed to match the
value of the contract inclusive of funding costs, repo spreads and collateralization. Using such an
approach, both the hedger and his counterparty generally disagree on the level of posted collateral
if their funding, repo or collateral rates differ or if they use different models to measure credit risk.
Hence, the two counterparties would need to enter into negotiations to agree on a collateral level. In
our model, this is avoided because the valuation agent determines the collateral requirements based
on the Black-Scholes price Vˆt of the claim, exclusive of funding and counterparty risk related costs.
3.3 The wealth process
We allow for collateral to be fully rehypothecated. This means that the collateral taker is granted an
unrestricted right to use the collateral amount, i.e., he can use it to purchase investment securities.
This is in agreement with most ISDA annexes, including the New York Annex, English Annex, and
Japanese Annex. We notice that for the case of cash collateral, the percentage of rehypothecated
collateral amounts to about 90% (see Table 8 in ISDA (2014)) hence largely supporting our assumption
of full collateral re-hypothecation. As in Bielecki and Rutkowski (2014), the collateral received can be
seen as an ordinary component of a hedger’s trading strategy, although this applies only prior to the
counterparty’s default. We denote by Vt(ϕ) the wealth process of the hedger and emphasize that the
collateral can actually be used by him (via rehypothecation) if he is the collateral taker.
Let ϕ :=
(
ξt, ξ
f
t , ξ
I
t , ξ
C
t ; t ≥ 0
)
, where we recall that ξt denotes the number of shares of the security,
ξft the number of shares in the funding account, and we use ξIt and ξCt to denote the number of shares of
trader and counterparty bonds, respectively, at time t. Recalling Eq. (7), and expressing all positions
in terms of number of shares multiplied by the price of the corresponding security, the wealth process
V (ϕ) is given by the following expression
Vt(ϕ) := ξtSt + ξIt P It + ξCt PCt + ξ
f
t B
rf
t + ψrtBrrt − ψctBrct , (10)
where we notice that the number of shares ψr of the repo account and the number of shares ψc held
in the collateral account are uniquely determined by equations (3) and (7), respectively.
Definition 3.1. A collateralized trading strategy ϕ is self-financing if, for t ∈ [0, T ], it holds that
Vt(ϕ) := V0(ϕ) +
∫ t
0
ξu dSu +
∫ t
0
ξIu dP
I
u +
∫ t
0
ξCu dP
C
u +
∫ t
0
ξfu dB
rf
u +
∫ t
0
ψru dB
rr
u −
∫ t
0
ψcu dB
rc
u ,
where V0(ϕ) = V0 is the initial endowment.
Moreover, we define the class of admissible strategies as follows:
Definition 3.2. The admissible set of trading strategies is given as class of F-predictable processes
such that the portfolio process is bounded from below, see also Delbaen and Schachermayer (2006).
3The average collateralization level in 2010 across all OTC derivatives was 73.1%. Positions with banks and broker
dealers are the most highly collateralized among the different counterparty types with levels around 88.6%. Expo-
sures to non-financial corporations and sovereign governments and supra-national institutions tend to have the lowest
collateralization levels, amounting to 13.9%.
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3.4 Close-out value of transaction
The ISDA market review of OTC derivative collateralization practices, see ISDA (2010), section 2.1.5,
states that the surviving party should evaluate the transactions that have been terminated due to the
default event, and claim for a reimbursement only after mitigating losses with the available collateral.
In our study, we follow the risk-free closeout convention meaning that the trader liquidates his position
at the market value when his counterparty defaults. Next, we describe how this is modeled in our
framework. Denote by θ the value of the replicating portfolio at τ , where we recall that τ has been
defined in Section 2. This value represents the amount of wealth that the trader must hold in order
to replicate the closeout payoffs when the transaction terminates. It is given by
θ = θ(τ, Vˆ ) := Vˆτ + 1l{τC<τI}LCY
− − 1l{τI<τC}LIY +
= 1l{τI<τC}θI(Vˆτ ) + 1l{τC<τI}θC(Vˆτ ), (11)
where Y := Vˆτ − Cτ= (1− α)Vˆτ is the value of the claim at default, netted of the posted collateral
and we define
θI(v) := v − LI((1− α)v)+, θC(v) := v + LC((1− α)v)−, (12)
where for a real number x we are using the notations x+ := max(x, 0), and x− := max(0,−x). The
term 1l{τC<τI}LCY − originates the residual CVA term after collateral mitigation, while 1l{τI<τC}LIY +
originates the DVA term, see also Brigo et al. (2014) and Capponi (2013) for additional details. The
quantities 0 ≤ LI ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ LC ≤ 1 are the loss rates against the trader and counterparty claims,
respectively.
Remark 3.3. We elaborate on why θ is the amount which needs to be replicated by the trader when
the transaction terminates. Suppose that the trader has sold a call option to the counterparty (hence
Vˆ (t, St) > 0 for all t). This means that the trader is always the collateral provider, Ct = αVˆ (t, St) >
0 for all t, given that the counterparty always measures a positive exposure to the trader. If the
counterparty defaults first and before the maturity of the claim, the trader will net the amount Vˆ (τ, Sτ )
owed to the counterparty with his collateral posted to the counterparty, and only return to her the
residual amount Y . As a result, his trading strategy must yield an actual wealth equal to this amount.
The above expression of closeout given by θ = Vˆ (τ, Sτ ) indicates that this is indeed the case. Because
the counterparty already holds the collateral, the trader only needs to return to her the amount Y ,
which is precisely the wealth process of the trader at τ .
4 Arbitrage-free valuation and XVA
The goal of this section is to find a valuation for the derivative security with payoff Φ(ST ) that is free
from arbitrage in a certain sense. Before discussing arbitrage-free valuations, we have to make sure
that the underlying market does not admit arbitrage from the hedger’s perspective (as discussed in
(Bielecki and Rutkowski, 2014, Section 3)). In the underlying market, the trader is only allowed to
borrow/lend stock, buy/sell risky bonds and borrow/lend from/to the funding desk. In particular,
neither the derivative security, nor the collateral process is involved.
Definition 4.1. We say that the market (S, P I , PC) admits hedger’s arbitrage if we can find a trading
strategy ϕ =
(
ξt, ξ
f
t , ξ
I
t , ξ
C
t ; t ≥ 0
)
such that, given a non-negative initial capital x ≥ 0 of the hedger and
denoting the wealth process corresponding to it
(
Vt(ϕ, x)
)
t≥0, we have that P
[
Vτ (ϕ, x) ≥ er
+
f
τx
]
= 1
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and P
[
Vτ (ϕ, x) > er
+
f
τx
]
> 0. If the market does not admit hedger’s arbitrage for the hedger’s initial
capital x ≥ 0, we say that the market is arbitrage free from the hedger’s perspective.
We will omit the arguments x, ϕ or both in the wealth process V (ϕ, x), whenever understood from
the context. In the sequel, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 4.2. The following relations hold between the different rates: r+r ≤ r−f , r+f ≤ r−f , and
r+f ∨ rD < µI ∧ µC .
Remark 4.3. The above assumption is necessary to preclude arbitrage. The condition rD < µI∧µC is
needed for the existence of the valuation measure as discussed at the end of section 3.1 (hQi = µi − rD
and risk-neutral default intensities must be positive). If, by contradiction, r+r > r−f , the trader can
borrow cash from the funding desk at the rate r−f and lend it to the repo market at the rate r+r , while
holding the stock as a collateral. This results in a sure win for the trader. Similarly, if the trader
could fund his strategy from the treasury at a rate r−f < r
+
f , it would clearly result in an arbitrage. The
condition r+f < µI (and mutatis mutandis r
+
f < µC) has a more practical interpretation: it precludes
the arbitrage opportunity of short selling the bond underwritten by the trader’s firm and investing the
proceeds in the funding account.
We next provide a sufficient condition guaranteeing that the underlying market is free of arbitrage.
Proposition 4.4. Suppose that in addition to Assumption 4.2, r+r ≤ r+f ≤ r−r . Then the model does
not admit arbitrage opportunities for the hedger for any x ≥ 0.
We remark that in a market model without defaultable securities, similar inequalities between
borrowing and lending rates have been derived by Bielecki and Rutkowski (2014) (Proposition 3.3),
and by Nie and Rutkowski (2013) (Proposition 3.1). We impose additional relations between lending
rates and return rates of the risky bonds given that our model also allows for counterparty risk.
Proof. First, observe that under the conditions given above we have
rrψ
r
t = r+r ψrt 1l{ψrt>0} + r
−
r ψ
r
t 1l{ψrt<0} ≤ r+f ψrt 1l{ψrt>0} + r+f ψrt 1l{ψrt<0} = r+f ψrt
rfξ
f
t = r+f ξ
f
t 1l{ξft >0} + r
−
f ξ
f
t 1l{ξft <0} ≤ r
+
f ξ
f
t 1l{ξft >0} + r
+
f ξ
f
t 1l{ξft <0} = r
+
f ξ
f
t
Next, it is convenient to write the wealth process under a suitable measure P˜ specified via the stochastic
exponential
dP˜
dP
∣∣∣∣
Gτ
= e
r+
f
−µ
σ
W Pτ−
(r+
f
−µ)2
2σ2 τ
(µI − r+f
hPI
)HIτ
e(r
+
f
−µI+hPI)τ
(µC − r+f
hPC
)HCτ
e(r
+
f
−µC+hPC)τ
By Girsanov’s theorem, P˜ is an equivalent measure to P such that the dynamics of the risky assets are
given by
dSt = r+f St dt+ σStdW
P˜
t ,
dP It = r+f P
I
t dt− P It−d$I,P˜t ,
dPCt = r+f P
C
t dt− PCt−d$C,P˜t
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where W P˜ := (W P˜t ; 0 ≤ t ≤ τ) is a (G, P˜)-Brownian motion and $I,P˜ := ($I,P˜t ; 0 ≤ t ≤ τ) as
well as $C,P˜ := ($C,P˜t ; 0 ≤ t ≤ τ) are (G, P˜)-martingales. The r+f discounted assets S˜t := e−r
+
f
tSt,
P˜ It := e
−r+
f
tP It and P˜Ct := e
−r+
f
tPCt are thus (G, P˜)-martingales. In particular, W P˜ = W P +
µ−r+
f
σ
and the default intensity of the hedger and of his counterparty under P˜ are given by hP˜i = µi − r+f ,
i ∈ {I, C}, which is positive in light of the assumptions of the proposition.
Denote the wealth process associated with (St, P It , PCt )t≥0 in the underlying market by Vˇt. Using
the self-financing condition, its dynamics are given by
dVˇt =
(
rfξ
f
t B
rf
t + r+f ξtSt + rrψ
r
tB
rr
t + r+f ξ
I
t P
I
t + r+f ξ
C
t P
C
t
)
dt
+ ξtσSt dW P˜t − ξIt P It− d$I,P˜t − ξCt PCt− d$C,P˜t
=
(
rfξ
f
t B
rf
t + rrψrtBrrt
)
dt+ ξt dSt + ξIt dP It + ξCt dPCt .
Then we have that
Vˇτ (ϕ, x)− Vˇ0(ϕ, x) =
∫ τ
0
(
r+f ξtSt + rfξ
f
t B
rf
t + rrψrtBrrt + r+f ξ
I
t P
I
t + r+f ξ
C
t P
C
t
)
dt
+
∫ τ
0
ξtσSt dW
P˜
t −
∫ τ
0
ξIt P
I
t− d$
I,P˜
t −
∫ τ
0
ξCt P
C
t− d$
C,P˜
t
≤
∫ τ
0
(
r+f ξtSt + r
+
f ξ
f
t B
rf
t + r+f ψ
r
tB
rr
t + r+f ξ
I
t P
I
t + r+f ξ
C
t P
C
t
)
dt
+
∫ τ
0
ξtσSt dW
P˜
t −
∫ τ
0
ξIt P
I
t− d$
I,P˜
t −
∫ τ
0
ξCt P
C
t− d$
C,P˜
t
=
∫ τ
0
r+f Vˇ (x) dt+
∫ τ
0
ξtσSt dW
P˜
t −
∫ τ
0
ξIt P
I
t− d$
I,P˜
t −
∫ τ
0
ξCt P
C
t− d$
C,P˜
t .
Therefore, it follows that
e−r
+
f
τ Vˇτ (ϕ, x)− Vˇ0(ϕ, x) ≤
∫ τ
0
ξt dS˜t −
∫ τ
0
ξIt dP˜
I
t− −
∫ τ
0
ξCt dP˜
C
t−.
Note that the right hand side of the above inequality is a local martingale bounded from below (as the
value process is bounded from below by the admissibility condition), and therefore is a supermartingale.
Taking expectations, we conclude that
EP˜
[
e−r
+
f
τ Vˇτ (ϕ, x)− Vˇ0(ϕ, x)
] ≤ 0.
Thus either P˜
[
Vˇτ (ϕ, x) = er
+
f
τx
]
= 1 or P˜
[
Vˇτ (ϕ, x) < er
+
f
τx
]
> 0. As P˜ is equivalent to P, this shows
that arbitrage opportunities for the hedger are precluded in this model (he would receive er
+
f
τx by
lending the positive cash amount x to the treasury desk at the rate r+f ).
Next we want to define the notion of an arbitrage free price of a derivative security from the hedger’s
perspective. We will assume that the hedger has zero initial capital, or equivalently, he does not have
liquid initial capital which can be used for hedging the claim until maturity. The hedging portfolio
will thus be entirely financed by purchase/sale of the stock via the repo market and purchase/sale of
bonds via the funding account. While our entire analysis might be extended to the case of nonzero
initial capital, such an assumption will simplify notation and allow us to highlight the key aspects of
the study.
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Definition 4.5. The valuation P ∈ R of a derivative security with terminal payoff ϑ ∈ FT is called
hedger’s arbitrage-free if for all γ ∈ R, buying γ securities for γP and hedging in the market with an
admissible strategy and zero initial capital, does not create hedger’s arbitrage.
Before giving a characterization of hedger’s arbitrage-free valuations, we analyze the dynamics of
the wealth process. We will rewrite it under the valuation measure Q for notational simplicity. Using
the condition (3), we obtain from Eq. (10) that
dVt =
(
rfξ
f
t B
rf
t + (rD − rr)ξtSt + rDξIt P It + rDξCt PCt − rcψctBrct
)
dt
+ ξtσSt dWQt − ξIt P It− d$I,Qt − ξCt PCt− d$C,Qt
=
(
r+f
(
ξft B
rf
t
)+ − r−f (ξft Brft )− + (rD − r−r )(ξtSt)+ − (rD − r+r )(ξtSt)− + rDξIt P It + rDξCt PCt ) dt
−
(
r−c
(
ψctB
rc
t
)+ − r+c (ψctBrct )−) dt+ ξtσSt dWQt − ξIt P It− d$I,Qt − ξCt PCt− d$C,Qt
=
(
r+f
(
ξft B
rf
t
)+ − r−f (ξft Brft )− + (rD − r−r )(ξtSt)+ − (rD − r+r )(ξtSt)− + rDξIt P It + rDξCt PCt ) dt
+
(
r+c
(
Ct
)+ − r−c (Ct)−) dt+ ξtσSt dWQt − ξIt P It− d$I,Qt − ξCt PCt−d$C,Qt . (13)
Setting
Zt = ξtσSt, ZIt = −ξIt P It−, ZCt = −ξCt PCt−, (14)
and using again the condition (3) and Eq. (10), we obtain
ξft B
rf
t = Vt − ξIt P It − ξCt PCt + ψctBrct
= Vt − ξIt P It − ξCt PCt − Ct. (15)
Then the dynamics in Eq. (13) reads as
dVt =
(
r+f
(
Vt + ZIt + ZCt − Ct
)+ − r−f (Vt + ZIt + ZCt − Ct)−
+ (rD − r−r )
1
σ
(
Zt
)+ − (rD − r+r ) 1σ (Zt)− − rDZIt − rDZCt + r+c (Ct)+ − r−c (Ct)−
)
dt
+ Zt dWQt + ZIt d$
I,Q
t + ZCt d$
C,Q
t .
We next define the drivers
f+
(
t, v, z, zI , zC ; Vˆ
)
:= −
(
r+f
(
v + zI + zC − αVˆt
)+ − r−f (v + zI + zC − αVˆt)−
+ (rD − r−r )
1
σ
z+ − (rD − r+r )
1
σ
z− − rDzI − rDzC
+ r+c
(
αVˆt
)+ − r−c (αVˆt)−) (16)
f−
(
t, v, z, zI , zC ; Vˆ
)
:= −f+(t,−v,−z,−zI ,−zC ;−Vˆ ), (17)
which depend on the market valuation process
(
Vˆt
)
t≥0 (via the collateral C) and we omit indicators as
we are interested in hedging only up to default. In particular f± : Ω× [0, T ]×R4, (ω, t, v, z, zI , zC) 7→
f±
(
t, v, z, zI , zC ; Vˆ
)
are drivers of BSDEs admitting unique solutions as implied by Corollary 4.8.
Moreover, define V +,γ and V −,γ as solutions of the BSDEs
−dV +,γt = f+
(
t, V +,γt , Z
+,γ
t , Z
I,+,γ
t , Z
C,+,γ
t ; Vˆ
)
dt− Z+,γt dWQt − ZI,+,γt d$I,Qt − ZC,+,γt d$C,Qt ,
V +,γτ = γ
(
θI(Vˆτ )1l{τI<τC∧T} + θC(Vˆτ )1l{τC<τI∧T} + ϑ1l{τ=T}
)
. (18)
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and
−dV −,γt = f−
(
t, V −γt , Z
−,γ
t , Z
I,−,γ
t , Z
C,−,γ
t ; Vˆ
)
dt− Z−,γt dWQt − ZI,−,γt d$I,Qt − ZC,−,γt d$C,Qt ,
V −,γτ = γ
(
θI(Vˆτ )1l{τI<τC∧T} + θC(Vˆτ )1l{τC<τI∧T} + ϑ1l{τ=T}
)
. (19)
We note that V +,γ describes the wealth process when replicating the claim γϑ for γ > 0 (hence
hedging the position after selling γ securities with terminal payoff ϑ) with zero initial capital. On
the other hand,
(−V −,γt ) describes the wealth process when replicating the claim −γϑ, γ > 0 (hence
hedging the position after buying γ securities with terminal payoff ϑ) with zero initial capital. Notice
that by positive homogeneity of the drivers f+ and f− of the BSDEs (18) and (19), it is enough
to consider the cases when γ = 1. To ease the notation, we set V +,1t = V +t and V
−,1
t = V −t . We
also note that the two BSDEs are intrinsically related: (V −, Z−, ZI,−, ZC,−) is a solution to the data(
f−, θI(Vˆτ )1l{τI<τC∧T} + θC(Vˆτ )1l{τC<τI∧T}, ϑ
)
if and only if (−V −,−Z−,−ZI,−,−ZC,−) is a solution
to the data
(
f+, θI(−Vˆτ )1l{τI<τC∧T} + θC(−Vˆτ )1l{τC<τI∧T},−ϑ
)
.
Our goal is to compute the total valuation adjustment XVA that needs to be added to the Black-
Scholes price of the claim to get the actual valuation. As we have seen, the situation is asymmetric
for sell- and buy-valuations, so we will have to define it both from the seller’s and buyer’s viewpoint.
Definition 4.6. The seller’s XVA is the G-adapted stochastic process (XVA)t≥0 defined as
XVA+t := V +t − Vˆt (20)
while the buyer’s XVA is defined as
XVA−t := V −t − Vˆt. (21)
XVA+ quantifies the total costs (including collateral, funding, and counterparty risk related costs)
incurred by the trader to hedge a long position in the option, whereas XVA− quantifies the total
costs incurred when hedging a short position. As we will see in Section 5.1, these two XVAs agree
only if the drivers of the BSDEs are linear. Noting that the agent’s valuation process Vˆ satisfies the
Black-Scholes BSDE
−dVˆt = −rDVˆt dt− Zˆt dWQt ,
VˆT = ϑ,
which is well known to admit a unique solution, we can immediately obtain BSDEs for the XV A±:
−dXVA±t = f˜±
(
t,XVA±t , Z˜±t , Z˜
I,±
t , Z˜
C,±
t ; Vˆ
)
dt
− Z˜±t dWQt − Z˜I,±t d$I,Qt − Z˜C,±t d$C,Qt ,
XVA±τ = θ˜C(Vˆτ )1l{τC<τI∧T} + θ˜I(Vˆτ )1l{τI<τC∧T}, (22)
with
Z˜±t := Z±t − Zˆt, Z˜I,±t = ZI,±t , Z˜C,±t = ZC,±t ,
θ˜C(vˆ) := LC((1− α)vˆ)−, θ˜I(vˆ) := −LI((1− α)vˆ)+, (23)
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and
f˜+
(
t, xva, z˜, z˜I , z˜C ; Vˆ
)
: = −
(
r+f
(
xva+ z˜I + z˜C + (1− α)Vˆt
)+ − r−f (xva+ z˜I + z˜C + (1− α)Vˆt)−
+ (rD − r−r )
1
σ
z˜+ − (rD − r+r )
1
σ
z˜− − rDz˜I − rDz˜C
+ r+c
(
αVˆt
)+ − r−c (αVˆt)−)+ rDVˆt, (24)
f˜−
(
t, xva, z˜, z˜I , z˜C ; Vˆ
)
: = −f˜+(t,−xva,−z˜,−z˜I ,−z˜C ;−Vˆ ). (25)
Note that comparing (16) with (24) and (17) with (25) we see that
f˜±(t, v, z˜, z˜I , z˜C ; vˆ
)
= f±(t, v + vˆ, z˜, z˜I , z˜C ; vˆ
)
+ rDvˆ. (26)
Next, we can apply the reduction technique developed by Crépey and Song (2015) to find a continuous
BSDE describing the XVA prior to default.
Theorem 4.7. The BSDEs
−dUˇ±t = gˇ±
(
t, Uˇ±t , Zˇ
±
t ; Vˆ
)
dt− Zˇ±t dWQt
Uˇ±T = 0 (27)
in the filtration F with
gˇ+
(
t, uˇ, zˇ; Vˆ
)
:= hQI
(
θ˜I(Vˆt)− uˇ
)
+ hQC
(
θ˜C(Vˆt)− uˇ
)
+ f˜+
(
t, uˇ, zˇ, θ˜I(Vˆt)− uˇ, θ˜C(Vˆt)− uˇ; Vˆ
)
(28)
gˇ−
(
t, uˇ, zˇ; Vˆ
)
:= −gˇ+(t,−uˇ,−zˇ;−Vˆ ), (29)
admit unique solutions
(
Uˇ±, Zˇ±
)
, which are related to the unique solutions
(
XVA±, Z˜±, Z˜I,±, Z˜C,±
)
of the BSDEs (22) via the following relations. On the one hand
Uˇ±t := XVA±t∧τ−,
Zˇ±t := Z˜±t 1l{t<τ},
are solutions to the reduced BSDE (27), and on the other hand the solutions to the full XVA BSDEs
given by Eq. (22) are given by
XVA±t := Uˇ±t 1l{t<τ} +
(
θ˜C(VˆτC )1l{τC<τI∧T} + θ˜I(VˆτI )1l{τI<τC∧T}
)
1l{t≥τ},
Z˜±t := Zˇ±t 1l{t<τ},
Z˜I,±t :=
(
θ˜I(Vˆt)− Uˇ±t
)
1l{t≤τ},
Z˜C,±t :=
(
θ˜C(Vˆt)− Uˇ±t
)
1l{t≤τ}.
Proof. As the equations (27) are continuous BSDEs with Lipschitz driver, existence and uniqueness
are classical (cf., e.g., (El Karoui et al., 1997, Theorem 2.1.)). The equivalence of the full G-BSDEs
and the reduced F-BSDEs follows from (Crépey and Song, 2015, Theorem 4.3): In our case we do
not change the probability measure and thus condition (A) is satisfied as the (H)-hypothesis holds
(note that condition (B) also holds in our context). Condition (J) is trivially satisfied as the terminal
condition does not depend on the auxiliary processes Z˜, Z˜C and Z˜I . Finally, by the martingale
representation theorems with respect to F and G (see (Bielecki and Rutkowski, 2001, Section 5.2)),
the martingale problems considered in Crépey and Song (2015) and the actual BSDEs considered in
the present article have the same unique solutions.
16
The uniqueness of the solutions to the original BSDEs for V ± as well as to their projected versions
in the F-filtration follows from the definition of XVA:
Corollary 4.8. Both the BSDE (18) and (19) admit a unique solution. These solutions are related to
the unique solutions
(
U¯±, Z¯±
)
of the BSDEs
−dU¯±t = g±
(
t, U¯±t , Z¯
±
t ; Vˆ
)
dt− Z¯±t dWQt
U¯±T = ϑ (33)
in the filtration F with
g+
(
t, u¯, z¯; Vˆ
)
:= hQI
(
θI(Vˆt)− u¯
)
+ hQC
(
θC(Vˆt)− u¯
)
+ f+
(
t, u¯, z¯, θI(Vˆt)− u¯, θC(Vˆt)− u¯; Vˆ
)
g−
(
t, u¯, z¯; Vˆ
)
:= −g+(t,−u¯,−z¯;−Vˆ ),
via the following relations. On the one hand
U¯±t := V ±t∧τ−,
Z¯±t := Z±t 1l{t<τ},
are solutions to the reduced BSDEs (33), while on the other hand the solutions to the full BSDEs given
by equations (18) and (19) are given by
V ±t := U¯±t 1l{t<τ} +
(
θC(VˆτC )1l{τC<τI∧T} + θI(VˆτI )1l{τI<τC∧T}
)
1l{t≥τ},
Z±t := Z¯±t 1l{t<τ},
ZI,±t :=
(
θI(Vˆt)− U¯±t
)
1l{t≤τ},
ZC,±t :=
(
θC(Vˆt)− U¯±t
)
1l{t≤τ}.
Remark 4.9. We discuss how the replicating strategies of the XVA process can be obtained from the
above given results. We use the tilde symbol ( ˜ ) to denote the strategies replicating the XVA process
(e.g., ξ˜, ξ˜I , ξ˜C denote, respectively, the number of stock, trader and counterparty bond shares used to
replicate XVA). This enables us to distinguish them from the strategies used to replicate the price
process Vt of the claim. From the martingale representation theorem and the dynamics of the stock
price (see also the discussion at the end of the proof of Proposition 5.3), it follows that
ξ˜±t =
Z˜±t
σSt
1l{t<τ}, ψ˜r,±t = −
ξ˜±t St
Brrt
1l{t<τ}.
From Theorem 4.7 along with equations (14) and (23), it follows that
ξ˜I,±t = −
Z˜I,±t
P It−
= −−LI((1− α)Vˆt)
+ − Uˇ±t
P It−
1l{t≤τ},
ξ˜C,±t = −
Z˜C,±t
PCt−
= −LC((1− α)Vˆt)
− − Uˇ±t
PCt−
1l{t≤τ}.
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From equations (9) and (7) it follows that
ψ˜ct = −
αVˆt
Brct
1l{τ>t}.
Finally, from Eq. (15), (replacing V ±t with XV A±t + Vˆt) we obtain
ξ˜f,±t =
V ±t − Vˆt − ξIt P It− − ξCt PCt−−αVˆt
B
rf
t
1l{τ>t}
= LC((1− α)Vˆt)
− − LI((1− α)Vˆt)+ + Uˇ±t − αVˆt
B
rf
t
1l{τ>t},
where in the last equation we have used the definitions of XVA±t given in equations (21) and (20) along
with the fact that XVA±t = Uˇ±t on the set {τ > t}.
Next, we analyze under which conditions the valuations obtained by solving the BSDEs are arbi-
trage free.
Theorem 4.10. Let Φ be a function of polynomial growth. Assume that
r+r ≤ r+f ≤ r−r , r+f ≤ r−f , r+f ∨ rD < µI ∧ µC , (34)
and
r+c ∨ r−c ≤ r−f ≤ µI ∧ µC . (35)
If V −0 ≤ V +0 , where V + and V − are the first components of the solutions to the BSDEs (18) and (19),
then there exist valuations pisup and piinf , piinf ≤ pisup, for the option ϑ = Φ(ST ) such that all values
in the closed interval [piinf , pisup] are free of hedger’s arbitrage. All valuations strictly bigger than pisup
and strictly smaller than piinf provide then arbitrage opportunities for the hedger. In particular, we
have that pisup = V +0 and piinf = V −0 .
Proof. First, notice that by virtue of the conditions in (34), the underlying market model is free of
hedger’s arbitrage. Next, we note that the trader can perfectly hedge a short call position with terminal
payoff ϑ = Φ(ST ) using the initial capital V +0 as the polynomial growth of Φ implies ϑ ∈ L2(Ω,FT ,P).
Thus it is clear that any value P > V +0 is not arbitrage free, as we could just sell the option for
that value, use V +0 to hedge the claim and deposit P − V +0 in the funding account. Using the same
argument, we can conclude that buying an option for any value P < V −0 will lead to arbitrage.
Second, assume by contradiction that a valuation P ≤ V +0 would lead to an arbitrage when selling
the option. This means that starting with initial capital P , the trader can perfectly hedge a claim with
terminal payoff ϑ′ ∈ FT , where ϑ′ ≥ ϑ = Φ(ST ) a.s. and P[ϑ′ > ϑ] > 0. As hQj = µj − rD, j ∈ {I, C},
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we have
g+(t, u¯, z¯; Vˆ ϑ′t )− g+(t, u¯, z¯; Vˆ ϑt )
= hQI
(
θI(Vˆ ϑ
′
t )− θI(Vˆ ϑt )
)
+ hQC
(
θC(Vˆ ϑ
′
t )− θC(Vˆ ϑt )
)
+
(
r−f − r+f
)((
θI(Vˆ ϑ
′
t ) + θC(Vˆ ϑ
′
t )− u¯− αVˆ ϑ
′
t
)+ − (θI(Vˆ ϑt ) + θC(Vˆ ϑt )− u¯− αVˆ ϑt )+)
− r−f
(
θI(Vˆ ϑ
′
t )− θI(Vˆ ϑt ) + θC(Vˆ ϑ
′
t )− θC(Vˆ ϑt )− α
(
Vˆ ϑ
′
t − Vˆ ϑt
))
+ rD
(
θI(Vˆ ϑ
′
t )− θI(Vˆ ϑt ) + θC(Vˆ ϑ
′
t )− θC(Vˆ ϑt )
)
+ αr−c
(
(Vˆ ϑ′t )− − (Vˆ ϑt )−
)
− αr+c
((
Vˆ ϑ
′
t
)+ − (Vˆ ϑt )+)
≥ (µI − r−f )(θI(Vˆ ϑ′t )− θI(Vˆ ϑt ))+ (µC − r−f )(θI(Vˆ ϑ′t )− θI(Vˆ ϑt ))
+ α
(
r−f − (r+c ∨ r−c )
)(
Vˆ ϑ
′
t − Vˆ ϑt
) ≥ 0.
To deduce the first inequality, we have used that the term multiplying r−f − r+f is positive. This
can be directly seen from the direct computation below
θI(Vˆ ϑ
′
t ) + θC(Vˆ ϑ
′
t )− αVˆ ϑ
′
t = (1− α)(1− LI)
(
Vˆ ϑ
′
t
)+ − (1− α)(1 + LC)(Vˆ ϑ′t )−
≥(1− α)(1− LI)
(
Vˆ ϑt
)+ − (1− α)(1 + LC)(Vˆ ϑt )− = θI(Vˆ ϑt ) + θC(Vˆ ϑt )− αVˆ ϑt .
To deduce the last inequality, we have used (35). Thus, we can apply the comparison principle for
F-BSDEs (El Karoui et al., 1997, Theorem 2.2) to U¯ and then notice that ϑ′ ≥ ϑ implies that Vˆ ϑ′t ≥ Vˆ ϑt ,
which in turn leads to the following inequality between the closeout terms: θC(Vˆ ϑ
′
t ) ≥ θC(Vˆ ϑt ) and
θI(Vˆ ϑ
′
t ) ≥ θI(Vˆ ϑt ) (see also Eq. (12) for their definitions). It thus follows that V ϑ
′
t ≥ V ϑt and in
particular P > V +0 (using strict comparison, i.e., P = V0 implies ϑ′ = ϑ a.s.), contradicting our
assumption. Using a symmetric argument, it follows that P ≥ V −0 . Thus, if V −0 ≤ V +0 , we can
conclude that all valuations in the interval [piinf = V −0 , V +0 = pisup] are arbitrage-free, whereas no
arbitrage free valuation exists if V −0 > V +0 .
We note that the width of the no-arbitrage interval can be described both in terms of the valuations
of the claim and of the XVA as
XVA+0 −XVA−0 = V +0 − V −0 = pisup − piinf .
The reduced BSDE also enables us to provide a PDE representation for the case ϑ = Φ(ST )
using just classical arguments based on the nonlinear Feynman-Kac formula. We provide such a
representation in the following proposition whose proof is reported in the appendix.
Proposition 4.11. The two-dimensional semilinear Cauchy problem
−u±t + Lu± = g±
(
t, u±, σ(u±x + uˆx); uˆ
)
, u±(T, x) = 0,
−wˆt + Lwˆ = −rDwˆ, wˆ(T, x) = Φ(ex), (36)
where the differential operator L is defined by
L := −
(
rD − σ
2
2
)
∂x − σ
2
2 ∂xx,
19
admits the unique viscosity solutions u± and it holds that u±(t, log (St)) = XVA±t 1l{t<τ}. Moreover,
if Φ is piecewise continuously differentiable with Φ and Φ′ (where defined) having at most polynomial
growth, then the Cauchy problems (36) has classical solutions.
Remark 4.12. The transformation from the BSDE (18) (or (19)) to the PDE (36) was derived by
projecting a G-BSDE to a F-BSDE and then applying the Feynman-Kac formula to it. One can
follow an alternative route, deriving first a PDE in four variables related to the BSDE with jumps
via a nonlinear Feynman-Kac formula, and then reducing the dimension. This is shown in detail in
Bichuch et al. II (2015), and we provide here the gist of the argument.
On {t < τ}, define the pre-default solutions v±(t, St, $I,Qt , $C,Qt ) = V ±t 1l{τ>t} to the BSDEs (18)
and (19). The existence of these measurable functions v±, i.e., the fact that V ± are Markovian, follows
from Proposition 4.1.1 in Delong (2013). Specifically, Theorem 3.2 in Bichuch et al. II (2015) shows
that v± satisfy
− v±t −
∑
j∈{I,C}
hQj
(
θj
(
vˆ(t, s)
)− v±(t, s, wI , wC)− v±j )− rDsv±s − 12σ2s2v±ss
− f±
(
t, v±, σsv±s (t, s, wI , wC), θI
(
vˆ(t, s)
)− v±(t, s, wI , wC), θC(vˆ(t, s))− v±(t, s, wI , wC); vˆ(t, s)) = 0,
v±(T, s, ·, ·) = Φ(s) (37)
in the viscosity sense. In the above expression, we have used the notation v±i = ∂v
±
∂wi
, i ∈ {I, C}.
Additionally, Theorem 3.2 in Bichuch et al. II (2015) shows that v± are the unique viscosity solutions
of the PDEs (37) satisfying
lim
|x|→∞
∣∣v±(·, ex, ·, ·)∣∣ e−c log2|x| = 0, c > 0.
The above step transfers the BSDEs (18) and (19) to the PDEs (37). The key step in the PDE domain
that parallels the transformation from the original BSDEs to the reduced BSDEs is given in Remark
3.3 of Bichuch et al. II (2015). Essentially, we are only concerned with V ±t before any default occurs,
hence we do no need to keep track of the martingale terms $j,Qt ’s. These are only needed to track the
occurrence of a default. If no default has occurred, $j,Qt = −hQj t. It then follows that v± becomes a
function of only two variables, i.e. v¯±(t, s) := v±(t, s,−hQI t,−hQCt). The PDEs (37) become
− v¯±t + (hQI + hQC)v¯±(t, s)− rDsv¯±s −
1
2σ
2s2v¯±ss
− f±(t, v¯±, σsv¯±s (t, s), θI(vˆ(t, s))− v¯±(t, s)θC(vˆ(t, s))− v¯±(t, s); vˆ(t, s)) =
∑
j∈{I,C}
hQj θj(vˆ(t, s)),
v¯±(T, s) = Φ(s).
From here, applying the standard change of variables x = log s, w¯±(t, x) = v¯±(t, ex) and wˆ(t, x) =
vˆ(t, ex), we obtain the PDEs
− w¯±t −
(
rD − σ
2
2
)
w¯±x −
1
2σ
2w¯±xx +
(
hQI + h
Q
C
)
w¯±
− f±
(
t, w¯±(t, x), σw¯±x (t, x), θI
(
wˆ(t, x)
)− w¯±(t, x), θC(wˆ(t, x))− w¯±(t, x); wˆ(t, x))
=
∑
j∈{I,C}
hQj θj
(
wˆ(t, x)
)
,
w¯±(T, x) = Φ(ex).
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The PDEs (36) follow by deriving the PDEs for w± = w¯± − wˆ, which are associated with the BSDEs
representation of the XVA given by equations (20) and (21). Hence, we can express XVA as a solution
to a Cauchy problem for a two-dimensional system of semilinear PDEs,
− w±t + Lw± = f±
(
t, w± + wˆ, σ(w±x + wˆ±x ), θˆI(wˆ)− w±, θˆC(wˆ)− w±; wˆ
)
+
∑
j∈{I,C}
hQj
(
θˆj(wˆ)− w±
)
+ rDwˆ, w±(T, x) = 0,
− wˆt + Lwˆ + rDwˆ = 0, wˆ(T, x) = Φ(ex). (38)
Recalling the definitions of f±, f˜±, and g± and their relations given in equations (16), (17), (24), (25),
(26) and (28), (29) we obtain that equations (38) and (36) coincide. At this point, we can conclude
that the unique solutions w± to the PDEs (38) are only in the viscosity sense. If Φ is piecewise
continuously differentiable and also Φ′ (where defined) has at most polynomial growth, then it follows
from Theorem 4.11 that the uniqueness of the solutions also holds in the classical sense. Moreover, we
can apply Theorem A.1 of Bichuch et al. II (2015) and obtain that, on the set {t < τ}, we have that
Z˜±t = σStw±x
(
t, log(St)
)
,
Z˜i,±t = θi
(
Vˆ (t, St)
)− w±(t, log(St)), i ∈ {I, C}.
5 Explicit examples
We specialize our framework to deal with a concrete example for which we can provide fully explicit
expressions for the total valuation adjustment. More specifically, we consider Piterbarg (2010)’s model
as well as an extension of it, accounting for counterparty credit risk and closeout costs. This means
that defaultable bonds of trader and counterparty become an integral part of the hedging strategy.
Throughout the section, we make the following assumptions on the interest rates, as in Piterbarg’s
setup:
r+f = r
−
f = rf , r
+
c = r−c = rc, rD = r+r = r−r = rr.
We also assume that rf > rr > rc, the case to be expected in practice according to Piterbarg (2010).
Under the above assumptions, the security, funding and collateral accounts do not depend on whether
the position in the security is long or short, whether the amount is borrowed from or lent to the
treasury, and whether the collateral is posted or received. Due to the symmetry between rates, the
buyer’s and seller’s XVA coincide, and hence we can drop both the plus and minus superscripts in
the BSDEs. The difference between the discount rate rD chosen by the valuation agent and the repo
rate may also be interpreted as a proxy for illiquidity of the repo market. Under this interpretation,
rD = rr corresponds to a regime of full liquidity. The BSDEs become linear and lead to explicit
additive decompositions of XVA in terms of different adjustments as detailed in the sequel. We also
remark that similar decompositions have been obtained by Brigo et al. (2012), see Theorem 4.3 and
subsequent remarks therein.
5.1 Piterbarg’s model
This section provides an explicit representation of XVA and the associated hedging strategy in the
framework proposed by Piterbarg (2010). Besides symmetry between rates, Piterbarg (2010) precludes
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the possibility of defaults in the model, but maintains the presence of collateral. Before presenting
the main result of this section, we introduce the following quantities
P
rf
t :=
B
rf
t
B
rf
T
, P rrt :=
Brrt
BrrT
,
which can be understood as the time t prices of two (fictitious) risk-free bonds with discount factors rf
and rr respectively. The next proposition, proven in the appendix, provides an explicit representation
of XVA and its replicating strategy.
Proposition 5.1. The total valuation adjustment is given by
XVAt =
(
P
rf
t
P rrt
− 1
)(
1− αrf − rc
rf − rr
)
Vˆt := βtVˆt. (39)
Furthermore, the replication strategy in stock is given by
ξ˜t = βt∆ˆt, (40)
where
∆ˆt = ∆ˆ(t, St) :=
∂
∂S
Vˆ (t, St) =
∂
∂S
EQ
[
Brrt
BrrT
Φ(ST )
∣∣∣∣Ft]. (41)
The representation (39) expresses XVA as a percentage of the publicly available price Vˆt of the
claim. Moreover, Proposition 5.1 shows that funding costs enter in two ways in the XVA and the
corresponding replicating strategy in the stock: (1) funding occurs at the rate rf , but XVA and
the hedging strategy are based on public valuation using rr as the discount rate and (2) a funding
adjustment proportional to the size of posted collateral, αVˆ (t, St), originating from the difference
between funding and collateral rates.
Remark 5.2. The model considered in this section is a special case of the model proposed by Piterbarg
(2010). Specifically, the model in Piterbarg (2010) is more general because the rates rr, rf and rc can
be stochastic processes, and he also allows for a general collateral specification. Differently from us,
Piterbarg (2010) does not define and study XVA, but rather focuses on determining the price of the
claim under the above mentioned assumptions. Under the symmetry assumption on rates and using
the collateralization rule given in Eq. (9), it can seen that equation (3) of Piterbarg (2010) is exactly
the solution of our BSDE (18), which admits the explicit representation
(
B
rf
t
)−1
Vt = EQ
[(
B
rf
T
)−1Φ(ST )∣∣Ft]+ α(rf − rc) ∫ T
t
(
B
rf
s
)−1
Brrs EQ
[(
Brrs
)−1
Vˆs
∣∣Ft]ds
=
(
B
rf
T
)−1
BrrT
1
Brrt
Vˆt + α(rf − rc)
∫ T
t
(
B
rf
s
)−1
Brrs
(
Brrt
)−1
Vˆtds.
The case of zero collateral in Piterbarg (2010) corresponds to setting α = 0 in our case. It is also
possible to derive equation (5) of Piterbarg (2010), in which it is assumed that the rate used for
discounting the claim is the collateral rate rc. To see this, consider Eq. (18), which under this setting
(and using Eq. (9)) becomes
dVt = rf (Vt − αVˆt) + rcαVˆt − ZtdWQt = rcVt + (rf − rc)(Vt − Ct)− ZtdWQt .
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We recall that Ct, t ≥ 0, denotes the collateral process. It then follows that
(
Brct
)−1
Vt =
(
BrcT
)−1Φ(ST )− ∫ T
t
(
Brcs
)−1
ZsdW
Q
s +
(
rf − rc
) ∫ T
t
(
Brcs
)−1(Vs − Cs)ds.
Taking the conditional expectation, and noticing that Z (computable in a similar way as in the proof
of Proposition 5.1) is square integrable and therefore the stochastic integral above is a true martingale,
we get
(
Brct
)−1
Vt = EQ
[(
BrcT
)−1Φ(ST )∣∣Ft]+ (rf − rc) ∫ T
t
(
Brcs
)−1EQ[Vs − Cs∣∣Ft]ds.
Deviating from our framework and assuming that the collateral rule is based on the hedger’s valuation,
we can use similar arguments as above and recover equation (7) of Piterbarg (2010) in the case of full
collateralization (Ct = Vt). The above analysis serves to illustrate the generality of our framework, in
which special tractable cases can be recovered by suitable specifications of the model parameters.
We next analyze the dependence of XVA on funding rates and collateralization levels. Figure 4
shows that in the case of a European call option the XVA is negative when the collateralization level
is small. This is consistent with the expression (39) and can be understood as follows. Suppose that
α = 0. In Piterbarg’s model, the hedger of the option is long in stock and finances purchases of stock
shares at the repo rate rr. He is also long in the funding account and accrues interests at the higher
rate rf . In the Black-Scholes world, the seller buys stock shares and invests cash, both at the rate
rr = rD. Hence, if rf > rr, the existence of the funding account is advantageous for the hedger. As a
result, the hedger’s price will be lower than the Black-Scholes price so that the XVA is negative. As
α gets larger, the trader also needs to finance purchases of the collateral to post to the counterparty.
In order to do so, he borrows from the treasury at the rate rf . However, he only receives interest at
rate rc on the posted collateral. This yields a loss to the trader given that rc < rr < rf . Figure 4
confirms our intuition. It also shows that the stock position of the trader decreases as the funding
rate rf increases, and increases if the collateralization level α increases. When XVA is negative, i.e.,
the hedger’s price is lower than the Black-Scholes price, then the strategy of the trader is to go short
in the stock.
5.2 Piterbarg’s model with defaults
In this section, we generalize Piterbarg’s model by including the possibility that the trader or his
counterparty default. Proposition 5.3 gives the explicit expression for XVA of a European claim, as
well as closed-form expressions for the replicating strategies in stocks and bonds. We specialize this
result to the case of an option in Remark 5.4.
Proposition 5.3. The total valuation adjustment is given by
XVAt1l{τ>t} =
(
(rr − rf ) + α(rf − rc)
)1− e−(η−rr)(T−t)
η − rr Vˆt1l{τ>t}
+ (µC − rf )LC 1− e
−(η−rr)(T−t)
η − rr
(
(1− α)Vˆt
)−1l{τ>t}
− (µI − rf )LI 1− e
−(η−rr)(T−t)
η − rr
(
(1− α)Vˆt
)+1l{τ>t}, (42)
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Figure 4: Left: XVA as a function of rf for different collateralization levels α. Right: Number of stock
shares in the XVA replication strategy. We set rD = 0.05, rc = 0.01, σ = 0.2, and α = 0. The claim
is an at-the-money European call option with maturity T = 1.
where η := µI + µC − rf . Furthermore, the XVA replication strategies in stock, counterparty and
trader’s bonds are given by
ξ˜t =
(
(rr − rf ) + α(rf − rc)1− e
−(η−rr)(T−t)
η − rr
+ (µC − rf )LC 1− e
−(η−rr)(T−t)
η − rr (1− α)1l{Vˆt<0}
− (µI − rf )LI 1− e
−(η−rr)(T−t)
η − rr (1− α)1l{Vˆt>0}
)
∆ˆt1l{τ>t},
ξ˜It =
XVAt + LI(1− α)(Vˆt)+
P It
1l{τ>t},
ξ˜Ct =
XVAt − LC(1− α)(Vˆt)−
PCt
1l{τ>t}. (43)
Moreover, on the event {t = τI < τC ∧ T}, the XVA process is given by
XVAt = ξ˜ft B
rf
t + ξ˜Ct PCt − ψ˜ctBrct − Vˆt = −LI((1− α)Vˆt)+, (44)
while on the event {t = τC < τI ∧ T} by
XVAt = ξ˜ft B
rf
t + ξ˜It P It − ψ˜ctBrct − Vˆt = LC((1− α)Vˆt)−.
Recall that under the no-arbitrage conditions given in Assumption 4.2 we have that µI > rf ,
µC > rf and hence η > rf > rr. As a consequence, the expression for the XVA given in Eq. (42)
is well defined. Moreover, the number of shares held in the repo, collateral and funding account
(ψ˜rt , ψ˜ct , ξ˜
f
t ) are uniquely determined by the holdings in stock, investor and counterparty bonds (see
Remark 4.9).
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As in the classical Piterbarg setup, the representation (42) shows that XVA admits a decomposition,
but now into three separate contributing terms. The first term corresponds to the replication in the
absence of defaults. It captures the costs of replicating the publicly available claim Vˆ (t, St) and of
funding the collateral posted until the earliest of investor or counterparty default. The second term
corresponds to the (funding-adjusted) replicating cost of the CVA component, and the third term to
the (funding-adjusted) replication cost of the DVA component.
Remark 5.4. Eq. (42) reduces to
XVAt1l{τ>t} =
(
(rr − rf ) + α(rf − rc)︸ ︷︷ ︸
funding
−LI(1− α)(µI − rf )︸ ︷︷ ︸
DVA
)1− e−(η−rr)(T−t)
η − rr Vˆt1l{τ>t}
:= AVˆt1l{τ>t}. (45)
Indeed, XVA is now expressed as a percentage of the publicly available price Vˆt of the claim. As the
trader is short in the call option and hence needs to replicate a long position to hedge, he always faces
zero exposure to the counterparty (the trader needs to post collateral to the counterparty, but the latter
does not need to do so with the trader), and hence he only needs to replicate the DVA component of
the trade which is not mitigated by the posted collateral. In this case the number of stock and bond
shares in (43) needed for his replicating strategy simplify to
ξ˜t = A× ∂
∂S
Vˆ (t, St)1l{τ>t}, ξ˜It =
A× Vˆt + LI(1− α)Vˆt
P It
1l{τ>t}, ξ˜Ct =
A× Vˆt
PCt
1l{τ>t}.
Moreover, on the event {t = τI < τC ∧T} the value of the portfolio is XVAt =
(
1−LI((1−α)
)
Vˆt, and
similarly on {t = τC < τI∧T} we have XVAt = Vˆt. Despite the CVA component of the trader is absent,
the hedger still trades in the counterparty bond. This is because he needs to hedge the default risk of
his counterparty given that the claim is being replicated until the earliest of hedger and counterparty
default time.
We conclude with a numerical assessment of the above derived results. We consider one at-the-
money option with S0 = K = 1, so that at maturity T = 1 we have the payoff Φ(x) = (x − K)+.
Figure 5 reports the value of the funding and DVA component contributing to the decomposition
given in Eq. (45). In the safer scenario (left panel), the funding component becomes predominant as
rf increases, while the contribution coming from the replication costs of the closeout position at the
trader’s default time is small. As the default risks of trader and counterparty become higher (right
panel) and for not too high funding rates rf , the DVA component dominates given that the closeout
procedure is triggered earlier and the closeout payoff is larger.
Comparing the bottom panels of Figures 6 and 7, we see that in both cases a similar number of
trader’s bond shares is used to replicate the jumps to the closeout values. However, the return on the
trader’s bond under the valuation measure is higher under the risky scenario, and hence offers a larger
contribution to XVA. When α is high, the XVA is positive. The position in the trader’s bond is higher
than in the counterparty bond given that a residual DVA component (after collateral mitigation)
needs to be replicated, while the CVA component is zero because the trader faces zero exposure to his
counterparty. As α increases, a smaller residual DVA component needs to be replicated given that the
position is more collateralized. As a consequence, the trader reduces the position in his own bonds.
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Figure 5: XVA decompositions (in % of the market value of the replicated claim) in the Piterbarg
model with defaults. We set rr = 0.05, rc = 0.01, σ = 0.2, α = 0.25, LC = 0.5, LI = 0.5. The claim
is an at-the-money European call option with maturity T = 1. Left: µI = 0.2, µC = 0.25. Right:
µI = 0.55, µC = 0.55.
A direct comparison of Figures 6 and 7 suggests that for moderately low levels of collateralization,
the trader purchases a higher number of his own bonds under the risky scenario, and partly finances
this position using the proceeds coming from the short sale of counterparty bonds.
Remark 5.5. The formulas for the XVA given in Eq. (42) and its specialization to a non-negative
payoff (45) can also be derived using representation results for linear BSDEs with jumps and direct
martingale arguments. Such an approach is used in (Bichuch et al. I, 2015, Section 5.2).
6 Numerical analysis
We conduct a comparative statics analysis to analyze the dependence of XVA and portfolio replicating
strategies on funding rates, bond returns, and collateralization levels in the general nonlinear setting
of section 4. We consider the relative XVA, i.e., express the adjustment as a percentage of the price Vˆt
of the claim, given by XVA±t /Vˆt. The claim is chosen to be a European-style call option on the stock
security, i.e., Φ(x) = (x −K)+. We consider one at-the-money option with S0 = K = 1 maturing at
T = 1. In order to focus on the impact of funding costs (which in practice is the most relevant) and
separate it from additional contributions to the XVA coming from asymmetries in collateral and repo
rates, we set r+c = r−c = 0.01 and r+r = r−r = 0.05, unless specified otherwise.
We use the following benchmark parameters: σ = 0.2, r+f = 0.05, r
−
f = 0.08, rD = 0.01, µI = 0.21,
µC = 0.16, LI = LC = 0.5, and α = 0.9. We compute the numerical solution of the PDE using a finite
difference Crank-Nicholson scheme. The main findings of our analysis are discussed in the sequel.
Higher funding rate increases the width of the no-arbitrage band. As the derivative contract
specifies both the price of the option and the level of collateralization of the deal, the no-arbitrage
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Figure 6: Top left: XVA as a function of rf for different α. Top right: Number of stock shares in the
replication strategy. Bottom left: Number of trader bond shares in the replication strategy. Bottom
right: Number of counterparty bond shares in the replication strategy. We set rr = 0.05, rc = 0.01,
σ = 0.2, LC = 0.5, LI = 0.5, µI = 0.16 and µC = 0.21. The claim is an at-the-money European call
option with maturity T = 1.
region appears as a (two-dimensional) band in XVA and α rather than as a (one-dimensional) interval
in XVA only. Figure 8 displays the no-arbitrage band, whose width is increasing in the funding rate
r−f . As α gets higher, the band noticeably shrinks reaching its minimum around α = 80% before
widening again. Notice that buyer’s and seller’s XVA do not have a symmetric behavior. This can be
better understood by analyzing the dependence of the band on the collateralization level α in Figure 8.
If α is not too high (α < 0.5), the widening of the no-arbitrage band with respect to the funding rate
r−f is due to decreasing buyer’s XVA. On the other hand, if α is high the buyer’s XVA is insensitive
to changes in r−f , whereas the seller’s XVA increases with r
−
f , contributing to widen the no-arbitrage
band. This is further supported by the numerical values reported in Table 1. When α < 0.5, the
position in the funding account for the seller’s XVA is long and the same regardless of the funding rate
r−f . On the other hand, the size of the long position for the buyer’s XVA increases in r
−
f . In presence
of full collateralization, i.e., α = 1, the situation reverses. The position in the funding account for the
buyer’s XVA is short and stays constant with respect to r−f . Vice versa, for the seller’s XVA the size
of the short position increases in r−f .
If α is high, the trader will have to post more collateral and consequently reduce the cash available
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Figure 7: Top left: XVA as a function of rf for different α. Top right: Number of stock shares in the
replication strategy. Bottom left: Number of trader bond shares in the replication strategy. Bottom
right: Number of counterparty bond shares in the replication strategy. We set rr = 0.05, rc = 0.01,
σ = 0.2, LC = 0.5, LI = 0.5, µI = 0.51 and µC = 0.51. The claim is an at-the-money European call
option with maturity T = 1.
to finance his replicating strategy. He will then have to borrow more from the funding desk, resulting
in higher funding costs. This drives up both the seller’s XVA and the number of shares of stocks and
bonds needed for the replication strategy.
Table 2 also indicates that the funding position corresponding to the seller’s XVA is negative, but
low, hence explaining why the buyer’s XVA is only mildly sensitive to changes in the funding rate r−f .
The no-arbitrage interval widens as the difference between repo rates increases. Figure
9 analyzes how the width of the no-arbitrage interval varies, when the difference between borrowing
and lending repo rates increases. For a fixed repo lending rate, the seller’s XVA increases in the repo
borrowing rate. This is because the hedger needs to replicate a long position in the claim and hence
incurs higher funding costs when he purchases stocks (cash driven repo activity, see also Figure 2). In
contrast, the buyer’s XVA is not sensitive to the repo borrowing rate. In this case, the hedger needs
to replicate a short position in the claim and hence implements a security driven repo activity which
only depends on the repo lending rate r+r (see also Figure 1). If the repo lending rate gets higher, the
hedger receives larger proceeds from the repo market and hence he is willing to purchase the claim at
a higher price as he gets more income from his short selling strategy, resulting in an increase of buyer’s
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Figure 8: Top left: Buyer’s and seller’s XVA as a function of α for different values of r−f . The seller’s
lies above the buyer’s XVA and the same line style is used for both. Top right: Number of stock shares
in the replication strategy. Bottom left: Number of trader’s bond shares in the replication strategy.
Bottom right: Number of counterparty’s bond shares in the replication strategy. The strategies refer
to the portfolio replicating the seller’s XVA.
XVA. This is also reflected in the right panel of Figure 9, suggesting that the trader who wants to
hedge his long position shorts a larger number of shares as r+r gets higher in order to benefit from the
higher rate received from the repo market.
Higher collateralization increases portfolio holdings. As the collateralization level α increases,
the seller’s XVA increases. This happens because the funding costs incurred from replicating the
collateralized position become higher. Because the trader needs to construct a portfolio replicating a
larger position, he must take more risk. He achieves this by increasing the number of shares of stock
and bonds underwritten by the counterparty. Moreover, he reduces the purchases of his own bonds
given that he needs to replicate a smaller residual DVA as the position becomes more collateralized
(the size of the downward jump to the closeout value at the trader’s default time is smaller). This
behavior is evident in the plot of Figure 10.
The width of the no-arbitrage band is insensitive to bond returns. Figure 10 shows that
both seller’s and buyers’s XVA decrease, if the return rate on the counterparty bond increases. When
α is low, the two quantities drop by nearly the same amount and the width of the no-arbitrage band
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α r−f Seller’s XVA: funding account ($) Buyer’s XVA: funding account ($)
0 0.08 0.0039 0.0403
0 0.15 0.0039 0.0428
0.25 0.08 0.0249 0.0257
0.25 0.15 0.0249 0.0274
0.75 0.08 -0.0037 -0.0036
0.75 0.15 -0.0038 -0.0033
1 0.08 -0.0182 -0.018
1 0.15 -0.0193 -0.018
Table 1: The columns give the dollar position in the funding account corresponding to the replicating
strategies of seller’s XVA and buyer’s XVA.
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Figure 9: Left: Buyer’s and seller’s XVA as a function of r−r for different values of r+r . Right: Number
of stock shares in the strategy replicating the seller’s XVA (top) and the buyer’s XVA (bottom).
is unaffected. As α gets larger, the seller’s XVA decreases faster relative to the buyer’s XVA and the
two quantities almost coincide when α = 1.
Consistently with Figure 10, Figure 11 shows that the seller’s XVA decreases when the return µC
on the counterparty bond increases. This happens because, keeping the historical default probability
constant, the trader would then earn a higher premium from his long position in counterparty’s bonds
(see also bottom panels of Figure 11). Such a gain dominates over the funding costs incurred when
replicating a larger closeout position (Eq. (11) indicates that the closeout payment increases to the
risk-free payoff Vˆ as hQC increases, and µC = h
Q
C + rD). Altogether, this means that the funding costs
of the investor would be reduced as µC increases.
7 Conclusions
We have developed an arbitrage-free valuation framework for the price of a European claim transacted
between two risky counterparties. Our analysis takes into account funding spreads to the treasury, the
repo market, collateral servicing costs, and counterparty credit risk. We have derived the no-arbitrage
band associated with the valuations of buyer and seller’s XVA, and shown that it collapses to a unique
XVA in the absence of rate asymmetries. Such a setting corresponds to a generalization of Piterbarg
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Figure 10: Top left: Buyer’s and seller’s XVA as a function of α for different values of µC . Top right:
Number of stock shares in the replication strategy. Bottom left: Number of trader’s bond shares in the
replication strategy. Bottom right: Number of counterparty’s bond shares in the replication strategy.
The strategies refer to the portfolio replicating the seller’s XVA.
(2010)’s model for which we are able to derive an explicit expression for the XVA.
Using the PDE representation of the BSDE, we have conducted a thorough numerical study ana-
lyzing the sensitivity of XVA and of the corresponding replication strategy to collateralization levels,
default risk and spreads between borrowing and lending rates.
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A Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 4.11.
Proof. First, notice that by the identity XVA±t 1l{t<τ} = Uˇ±t 1l{t<τ} proven in Theorem 4.7 and us-
ing the nonlinear Feynman-Kac theorem (cf. (El Karoui e.a., 2008, Theorem 3.2)), it follows that
31
r−f Seller’s XVA: funding ($) Buyer’s XVA: funding account ($)
0.08 -0.0124 -0.0123
0.1 -0.0125 -0.0122
0.15 -0.0127 -0.0122
0.2 -0.013 -0.0122
Table 2: The columns give the dollar position in the funding account corresponding to the replicating
strategies of seller’s XVA and buyer’s XVA. We set µC = 0.16.
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Figure 11: Top left: Seller’s XVA as a function of µC for different values of α. Top right: Number of
stock shares in the replication strategy. Bottom left: Number of trader’s bond shares in the replication
strategy. Bottom right: Number of counterpart bond shares in the replication strategy. The replicating
portfolio refers to the seller’s XVA.
XVA±t 1l{t<τ} = xva±(t, St), where xva± are the unique viscosity solutions of
−xva±t − rDsxva±s −
1
2σ
2s2xva±ss − g±
(
t, xva±, σs(xva±s + vˆs
)
; vˆ) = 0,
xva±(T, s) = 0.
In the above expression vˆ =vˆ(t, s) denotes Black-Scholes price at time t of the claim with payoff Φ(ST )
when St = s. Applying the change of variables x = log (s) and setting u±(t, x) = xva±(t, ex), wˆ(t, x) =
vˆ(t, ex), x ∈ R, implies the first part of the proposition.
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Assume now first that Φ is continuously differentiable and Φ and Φ′ are of polynomial growth, i.e.,
|Φ(s)| ≤ C(1 + sn), |Φ′(s)| ≤ C(1 + sn), for all s ∈ R>0 for some n > 0. Using the transformations
u¯±(t, x) = u
±(t, x)
1 + e2nx ,
¯ˆw(t, x) = wˆ(t, x)1 + e2nx , Φ¯(x) =
Φ(ex)
1 + e2nx , (46)
we note that u¯± satisfy the Cauchy problem
− u¯±t −
1
2σ
2u¯±xx −
(((4n− 1)e2nx − 1)σ2
2(1 + e2nx) + rD
)
u¯±x −
(
2rD + (2n− 1)σ2
)
ne2nx
1 + e2nx u¯
±
= g±
(
t, u¯±, σ
(
u¯±x +
2ne2nx
1 + e2nx u¯
± + ¯ˆwx +
2ne2nx
1 + e2nx
¯ˆw
)
; ¯ˆw
)
,
u¯±(T, x) = 0, (47)
together with
− ¯ˆwt − 12σ
2 ¯ˆwxx −
(((4n− 1)e2nx − 1)σ2
2(1 + e2nx) + rD
)
¯ˆwx −
(
2rD + (2n− 1)σ2
)
ne2nx
1 + e2nx
¯ˆw = −rD ¯ˆw,
¯ˆw(T, x) = Φ¯(x). (48)
The above transformation guarantees that both Φ¯ and Φ¯′ are bounded. Then the existence of a smooth
(and bounded) solution to (47), (48) follows from Theorem 20.2.1 in Cannon (1984). In the case that
Φ¯ is only piecewise smooth, the original proof can be modified following a similar procedure to Jouini
and Kallal (1995). Hence, using the change of variables (46), we conclude that there exists a classical
solution to the Cauchy problem (36).
Proof of Proposition 5.1.
Proof. In the absence of defaults, the BSDE (22) is given by
−dXVAt = −rfXVAtdt+ (rf − rc)αVˆtdt+ (rr − rf )Vˆtdt− Zˇt dWQt
XVAT = 0,
where we have omitted the superscript ± given that seller’s and buyer’s XVA coincide due to the
symmetry of rates. Moreover, we have used the collateral specification given in Eq. (9), and the
assumption that rD = rr. The above BSDE admits the following integral representation
e−rf tXVAt = −
∫ T
t
(Brfs )−1Zˇs dWQs + (rf − rc)α
∫ T
t
(Brfs )−1Vˆsds+ (rr − rf )
∫ T
t
(Brfs )−1Vˆsds.(49)
Using the Clark-Ocone formula, we can find Zˇt by means of Malliavin Calculus (see Nualart (1995)
for an introduction to Malliavin derivatives). We have that
e−rf tZˇt = EQ
[
Dt
(∫ T
t
(
B
rf
s
)−1(
α
(
rf − rc
)
+ (rr − rf )
)
Vˆs ds
)∣∣∣Ft],
33
where Dt denotes the Malliavin derivative which may be computed as
Dt
(∫ T
t
(
B
rf
s
)−1(
α
(
rf − rc
)
+ (rr − rf )
)
Vˆs ds
)
=
∫ T
t
(
B
rf
s
)−1(
α(rf − rc) + (rr − rf )
)
DtVˆs ds
=
∫ T
t
(
B
rf
s
)−1(
α(rf − rc) + (rr − rf )
) ∂
∂S
Vˆ (s, Ss)σSs ds. (50)
Above, we have used the chain rule of Malliavin calculus and the well known fact that DtSs = σSs
for s > t. We expect that the Zˇ term of the BSDE would correspond to an “adjusted delta hedging”
strategy, with the delta hedging strategy recovered if all rates are identical. Indeed, using the definition
of ∆ˆ given in Eq. (41), the Malliavin derivative in Eq. (50) may be written in terms of ∆ as
Dt
(
...
)
=
(
α(rf − rc) + (rr − rf )
) ∫ T
t
1
B
rf
s
∆ˆsσSs ds.
Therefore, we get
e−rf tZˇt =
(
α(rf − rc) + (rr − rf )
) ∫ T
t
1
B
rf
s
σEQ
[
∆ˆsSs
∣∣Ft] ds
=
(
α(rf − rc) + (rr − rf )
) ∫ T
t
1
B
rf
s
σBrrs EQ
[
∆ˆs
Ss
Brrs
∣∣∣Ft] ds
=
(
α(rf − rc) + (rr − rf )
) ∫ T
t
Brrs
B
rf
s
σ∆ˆt
St
Brrt
ds
=
(
α(rf − rc) + (rr − rf )
) σSt
rr − rf
1
Brrt
(
BrrT
B
rf
T
− B
rf
t
B
rf
t
)
∆ˆt, (51)
where we have used the martingale property EQ
[
∆ˆs SsBrrs
∣∣Ft] = StBrrt ∆ˆt. Indeed, from Eq. (41) and using
the fact that ST =
BrrT
Brrt
Ste
−σ22 (T−t)+σ(WQT−WQt ) (which follows from (8)), we conclude that
St
Brrt
∆ˆt =
St
Brrt
∂
∂S
EQ
[
Brrt
BrrT
Φ(ST )
∣∣∣∣Ft] = StBrrt EQ
[
Φ′(ST )e−
σ2
2 (T−t)+σ(WQT−WQt )
∣∣∣∣Ft]
= EQ
[
Φ′(ST )
ST
BrrT
∣∣∣∣Ft] = EQ[∆ˆT STBrrT
∣∣∣∣Ft],
where we have interchanged derivative and expectation by differentiating under the integral sign.
This is well justified given that we are computing the expectation of a smooth function of a Gaussian
random variable.
We note that Zˇ is square integrable and therefore the stochastic integral in (49) is a true martingale.
Using this fact in the integral representation (49) and taking conditional expectations, we can provide
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an explicit solution for the BSDE as follows:
XVAt =
(
α(rf − rc) + (rr − rf )
) ∫ T
t
B
rf
t
B
rf
u
EQ
[
Vˆu
∣∣Ft]du
=
(
α(rf − rc) + (rr − rf )
)
B
rf
t
∫ T
t
e−(rf−rr)uEQ
[(
Brru
)−1
Vˆu
∣∣Ft]du
=
(
1− αrf − rc
rf − rr
)
B
rf
t
Brrt
(
BrrT
B
rf
T
− B
rr
t
B
rf
t
)
Vˆt,
where in the last step we have used the martingale property of the discounted payoff. This correspond
with Eq. (39) after straightforward adjustments. Finally, Eq. (40) follows from (51) together with the
first identity in (14).
Proof of Proposition 5.3.
Proof. The proof follows a similar route to that of Proposition 5.1. In the presence of defaults and
when the rates are symmetric, the reduced BSDE for XVA (27) becomes
−dUˇt =
(
(rf − rc)αVˆt + (rr − rf )Vˆt +
∑
j∈{I,C}
(µj − rf )θ˜j(Vˆt)
)
dt− ηUˇt dt− Zˇ±t dWQt ,
UˇT = 0. (52)
The above BSDE admits the following integral representation:
e−ηtUˇt = −
∫ T
t
e−ηsZˇsdWQs +
∫ T
t
(rf − rc)αe−ηsVˆsds+
∫ T
t
(rr − rf )e−ηsVˆsds
+
∑
j∈{I,C}
(
µj − rf
) ∫ T
t
e−ηsθ˜j(Vˆs)ds− η
∫ T
t
e−ηsds.
Using the Clark-Ocone formula, we can find Zˇt by means of Malliavin Calculus. We have that
e−ηtZˇt = EQ
[∫ T
t
e−ηs
(
α(rf − rc) + (rr − rf )
)
DtVˆs ds
∣∣∣Ft]
+ EQ
[ ∑
j∈{I,C}
(µj − rf )
∫ T
t
e−ηsDtθ˜j(Vˆs) ds
]
.
It holds that DtVˆs = ∆ˆsσSs. Using Proposition 1.2.4 in Nualart (1995) and Eq. (23), we obtain
Dtθ˜C(Vˆs) = LC(1− α)Dt
(
Vˆs
)− = LC(1− α)1l{Vˆs<0} ∂∂S Vˆ (s, Ss)σSs,
and
Dtθ˜I(Vˆs) = −LI(1− α)Dt
(
Vˆs
)+ = −LI(1− α)1l{Vˆs>0} ∂∂S Vˆ (s, Ss)σSs.
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From that, we obtain the following equality
e−ηtZˇt =
(
α(rf − rc) + (rr − rf )
)
σ
∫ T
t
e−ηsEQ
[
∆ˆsSs
∣∣Ft] ds
+ (µC − rf )LC(1− α)
∫ T
t
e−ηsEQ
[
∆ˆs1l{Vˆs<0}σSs
∣∣Ft] ds
− (µI − rf )LI(1− α)
∫ T
t
e−ηsEQ
[
∆ˆs1l{Vˆs>0}σSs
∣∣Ft]ds
=
(
α(rf − rc) + (rr − rf )
)
σ
∫ T
t
e−ηsBrrs EQ
[
∆ˆs
Ss
Brrs
∣∣∣∣Ft]ds
+ (µC − rf )LC(1− α)σ
∫ T
t
e−ηsBrrs EQ
[
∆ˆs1l{Vˆs<0}
Ss
Brrs
∣∣∣∣Ft] ds
− (µI − rf )LI(1− α)σ
∫ T
t
e−ηsBrrs EQ
[
∆ˆs1l{Vˆs>0}σ
Ss
Brrs
∣∣∣∣Ft] ds
=
(
α(rf − rc) + (rr − rf )
)
σ
St
Brrt
1
rr − η
(
BrrT
eηT
− B
rr
t
eηt
)
∆ˆt
+ (µC − rf )LC(1− α)σ St
Brrt
1
rr − η
(
BrrT
eηT
− B
rr
t
eηt
)
∆ˆt
− (µI − rf )LI(1− α)σ St
Brrt
1
rr − η
(
BrrT
eηT
− B
rr
t
eηt
)
∆ˆt.
The last step is justified by the fact that η > rr. We note that Zˇ is square integrable and therefore
the stochastic integral in (49) is a true martingale. Using this fact in the integral representation (52),
and taking the conditional expectation, it follows that
e−ηtUˇt =
∫ T
t
(rf − rc)αe−ηsE
[
Vˆs
∣∣Ft]ds+ ∫ T
t
(rr − rf )e−ηsE
[
Vˆs
∣∣Ft]ds
+
∫ T
t
e−ηs
(
(µC − rf )LCEQ
[
((1− α)Vˆs)−
∣∣Ft]+ (µI − rf )LIEQ[((1− α)Vˆs)+∣∣Ft])ds
=
(
(rf − rc)α+ (rr − rf )
) ∫ T
t
e−ηsBrrs EQ
[(
Brrs
)−1
Vˆs
∣∣Ft]ds
+ (µC − rf )LC
∫ T
t
e−ηsBrrs EQ
[(
Brrs
)−1((1− α)Vˆs)−∣∣Ft]ds
− (µI − rf )LI
∫ T
t
e−ηsBrrs EQ
[(
Brrs
)−1((1− α)Vˆs)+∣∣Ft]ds
=
(
(rf − rc)α+ (rr − rf )
) ∫ T
t
e−ηsBrrs
(
Brrt
)−1
Vˆt
+ (µC − rf )LC
∫ T
t
e−ηsBrrs
(
Brrt
)−1((1− α)Vˆt)−
− (µI − rf )LI
∫ T
t
e−ηsBrrs
(
Brrt
)−1((1− α)Vˆt)+,
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where we have used the martingale properties of the discounted payoffs. It thus follows that
Uˇt = (rr − rf )1− e
−(η−rr)(T−t)
η − rr Vˆt + α(rf − rc)
1− e−(η−rr)(T−t)
η − rr Vˆt
+ (µC − rf )LC 1− e
−(η−rr)(T−t)
η − rr (1− α)
(
Vˆt
)−
− (µI − rf )LI 1− e
−(η−rr)(T−t)
η − rr (1− α)
(
Vˆt
)+
,
which yields by (32) and multiplying with the indicator 1l{τ>t} Eq. (42). We next compute the hedging
strategy ξ˜ in the stock using the martingale representation theorem. Consider the stock replicating
strategy ξ˜. Then the investment in stock has the dynamics
ξ˜tdSt = ξ˜tµStdt+ ξ˜tσStdWt.
By the martingale representation theorem in the H-filtration one can split every semimartingale
uniquely into an absolutely continuous part, a Brownian martingale and two jump martingales. It
follows that ξ˜tσStdWt = −Z˜tdWt. By the uniqueness of the martingale representation, it follows that
ξ˜tσSt = −Z˜t and thus the claimed result. An analogous argument applies for the bond strategies.
Finally, Eq. (44) follows directly from the expression for XVAt given in Eq. (32).
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